Indus Water Treaty Suspension and Lessons for the Proposed SL – India Power Grid Interconnection Project

Introduction

On the 22^nd of April 2025, the serene valleys of Pahalgam, Kashmir was disturbed by a brutal terrorist attack which killed 26 innocent tourists. This resulted in the suspension of Indus Water Treaty by India.

Above development and the proposed SL – India Power Grid Interconnection Project reminded me of a small section in the famous treatise on statecraft, “The Prince” by Niccolo Machiavelli which says:

in the beginning of the malady, it is easy to cure but difficult to detect, but in the course of time… it becomes easy to detect but difficult to cure. This it happens in affairs of state… (Machiavelli, 1536, p.38).

Above statement highlights the importance of identifying problems in advance and duly curing them before they become incurable.

Therefore, this article will briefly discuss about India – Pakistan relations, their water dispute and subsequent adoption of the Indus Water Treaty (IWT). Thereafter, it will discuss the important provisions of IWT and its ultimate suspension after the Pahalgam Attack and legality of such suspension. Then the article will discuss some of the lessons that can be drawn from IWT suspension. Thereafter, the article will discuss Sri Lanka’s electricity system and proposed SL – India Power Grid Interconnection Project applying the lessons drawn from IWT suspension.

Partition and India – Pakistan Relations

In the lead up to the independence of British India, Indian Muslims, demanded a separate nation for them. Some attribute this to Muhammed Ali Jinnah’s belief that Indian Congress Party was not giving due regard to the interests of Muslims. Therefore, Jinnah and the Muslim League fought for an independent Islamic nation (Mourya & Mittal, 2021) which ultimately led to the partition of British India in 1947 along the “borders drawn up by the British Barrister Sir Cyril Radcliffe who had famously never travelled further east than Paris before” (Phillips, 2017, p.1). However, the mass movement of people during the partition proved to be “frightening and gruesome for both the nations” (Mourya & Mittal, 2021, p.22).

Since then, India and Pakistan have looked at each other with suspicion and caution. They fought each other in multiple wars and conflicts. During the 1971 war, India aided East Pakistan to declare independence from West Pakistan creating the modern-day Bangladesh.  

Substantial part of this feud can be attributed to the territorial dispute over the beautiful Kashmir region which was divided by 1947 partition.

Figure 1 - Beautiful Kashmir

Further, mutual accusations of cross border terrorism also play a key part in the tensions between them.

Water Dispute between the Upper Riparian State and the Lower Riparian State

As noted by Bhasin (2012), “partition was a unique phenomenon” in which even the “roads and railroads were cut, rivers and streams were divided” (p. XL).

Importantly, partition divided the Kashmir region which rests “directly across the vast and vital Indus River Basin” and caused a dispute over territorial and water rights between the two nations (Birch et al, 2006, p.32). Based on geography, India was the upper riparian state having potential control over the rivers while Pakistan was the lower riparian state.

According to Birch et al. (2006):

Pakistani provinces of Punjab and Sindh and Indian controlled Kashmir and much of the Indian states of Punjab, Haryana and Rajasthan rely largely on the water of the Indus and its tributaries… without the water of these rivers, much of the region would be a desert (p.32).

These disputed water ways were essential to both nations as they supplied the water required for agriculture, irrigation and industrial/domestic uses while contributing to the hydropower projects (Birch et al, 2006). However, based on Sir Cyril Radcliff’s partition, “Pakistan found that the water, which is its lifeblood, originated in another country with which it had hostile relations” (Birch et al, 2006, p.32).

In 1947 itself, the 02 nations concluded a Standstill Agreement providing for the waterflow from India to Pakistan. When that Agreement ended on 01^st April 1948, India stopped the water flow immediately (Birch et al, 2006). However, another agreement was signed in May 1948 but Pakistan subsequently backed out claiming that they “signed under duress” (Birch et al., 2006, p.32).

Thereafter, the World Bank offered to mediate the resolution of this issue and both nations accepted the offer. Upon extensive negotiations for over 10 years, the Indus Water Treaty was signed by Indian PM Nehru, Pakistani President Field Marshal Ayub Khan (Curtis, 2025).

In this context, IWT stands as a unique diplomatic achievement of India and Pakistan with the aid of World Bank and other international supporters which peacefully resolved a crucial bilateral issue.

Important Provisions of Indus Water Treaty 1960

Following are some of the important provisions in the IWT 1960. Under Article II (1), all Eastern Rivers (The Sutlej, The Beas, and The Ravi) were made available for the unrestricted use of India.

Under Article III (1) all Western Rivers (The Indus, The Jhelum, and The Chenab) were made available for the unrestricted use of Pakistan. Under Article III (2), India was made obliged to let flow all waters of Western Rivers and not permit any interferences with these waters unless as limitedly provided.

Further, under Article VI (1), both countries were made obliged to regularly exchange data relating to the water flow and utilization of waters such as the daily gauge, discharge data and daily extractions for and releases from reservoirs.

Article VIII, created the Permanent Indus Commission comprising with 02 commissioners, one from each country. This commission was tasked with implementing the IWT, promoting cooperation, settling questions, undertaking inspections and preparing annual reports etc.

Article IX, provided for the settlement of differences and disputes. Accordingly, disputes relating to interpretation or application of IWT or disputes concerning the existence of any relevant fact are to be first examined by the Permanent Indus Commission though agreement. Where unsuccessful, dispute is to be resolved by other means such as through a Natural Expert or Negotiation with or without mediation or through arbitration.

Pahalgam Attack and Suspension of IWT

However, a day after the brutal Pahalgam terrorist attack, India’s Ministry of External Affairs announced that they will be holding the 1960 Indus Water Treaty in abeyance with immediate effect “until Pakistan credibly and irrevocably abjures its support for cross border terrorism” (Ministry of External Affairs, 2025, p.1, emphasis added).

Apart from the suspension, it was reported that India ceased sharing water data with Pakistan. Such cessation of data sharing by India negatively impacts Pakistan by disturbing its disaster, agricultural and irrigational planning abilities (Vishwanath, 2025). Further, some in India even threatened to block the water flow to Pakistan (Curtis, 2025).

In response, Pakistani PM reiterated the importance of those waterways and emphasized that any attempts to block the water flow, violating the IWT 1960, will be responded with full force (Dawn, 2025).

However, the legality/illegality of India’s actions - such as stopping water and not sharing data etc. - depends on whether the 1960 IWT is legally suspended or not. Therefore, the following discussion deals with that.

Legality of the IWT Suspension

Interestingly, India, in its communiques, used the term “abeyance” instead of the word “suspension”. However, Cambridge Dictionary (2025) notes that, the word ‘abeyance’ is synonymous with the word ‘suspension’. Therefore, it is pertinent to consider the rules relating to suspension of an international treaty to consider the legality of India’s decision to hold the Indus Water Treaty in abeyance. 

The general rules of International Law relating to Treaties are contained in Vienna Convention of Law of Treaties 1969 (VCLT). However, India is not a state party to VCLT and thereby, they may argue that VCLT rules don’t apply to them. Yet, it is generally accepted that, VCLT mirrors the Customary International Law relating to treaties. Therefore, it can be counter-argued that, those rules are nevertheless applicable to India in a customary international law sense (Bajoria, 2025).

Thereby, Article 42(2) of VCLT notes that, suspension of an international treaty may take place only according to the provisions of the relevant treaty or according to VCLT.

Therefore, it is pertinent to consider the relevant provisions within Indus Water Treaty first.

·       According to Article XII (3), IWT may be modified by a duly ratified treaty concluded for that purpose between the 02 governments.

·       As per Article XII (4), IWT “shall continue in force until terminated by a duly ratified treaty concluded for that purpose between the 02 governments”.

·       Further, there are no provisions in the IWT providing for its suspension (Curtis, 2025).

Therefore, it is clear that, IWT is not duly suspended under above provisions in this scenario.

Secondly, it must be considered whether IWT is duly suspended under VCLT provisions.

·       As per Article 57, a treaty may be suspended in conformity with the provisions of that treaty or with the consent of other party. However, as noted above, IWT is not duly suspended under its provisions and India has not obtained Pakistan’s consent for the suspension of IWT. Therefore, IWT is not duly suspended under this article.

·     As per Article 60, suspension of a treaty may take place where the other party has committed a “material breach”.  

Interestingly, the arguments contained in the official notification sent to Pakistan by India’s Secretary to the Ministry of Jal Shakti on the suspension of IWT, hints their apparent reliance under this ground as follows;

The obligation to honour a treaty in good faith is fundamental to a treaty. However, what we have seen instead is sustained cross-border terrorism by Pakistan targeting the Indian Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir… The resulting security uncertainties have directly impeded India’s full utilisation of its rights under the Treaty (Mukherjee, 2025, p.1).

Furthermore, apart from other breaches committed by it, Pakistan has refused to respond to India’s request to enter into negotiations as envisaged under the Treaty and is thus in breach of the Treaty (Mukherjee, 2025, p.1).

However, as per Article 60 (3), a “material breach” of a treaty consists in; the repudiation of a treaty against VCLT provisions; the violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose of the treaty.

Since Pakistan has not repudiated the IWT, India must prove that Pakistan (and not anyone else) has violated a provision essential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose of the treaty.

·   As per Article 61, a treaty may be suspended where there is a temporary impossibility of performance resulting from the disappearance or destruction of an object indispensable for the execution of treaty.

·    As per Article 62, suspension of a treaty may take place in limited instances where a fundamental change of circumstances has occurred.

The above noted notification, sent by Jal Shakti Secretary, also hints at their reliance under this ground as it refers to an alleged fundamental change as it says:

These changes include significantly altered population demographics, the need to accelerate the development of clean energy and other changes in the assumptions underlying the sharing of waters under the treaty (Mukherjee, 2025, p.1)

However, as per Article 62 (1), India must prove that; the circumstances (which is now fundamentally changed) constituted an essential basis for parties’ consent; and the effect of the change radically transformed the extent of obligations under the treaty.

Therefore, in summary, IWT is not duly suspended under its own provisions and its proper suspension under Art 60 or 62 of VCLT is open to debate as one could argue that India’s real concern was not a material breach by Pakistan or a fundamental change of circumstances but their national security and strategic concerns. Their own submission that that they decided to hold IWT in abeyance “until Pakistan credibly and irrevocably abjures its support for cross border terrorism” may support such assertion (Ministry of External Affairs, 2025, p.1).

Lessons from Indus Water Treaty Suspension

Suspension of the IWT, as discussed above, provides some valuable lessons concerning state dependency on other nations over vital resources. Therefore, writer believes that such lessons should not be ignored but be studied and be applied by leaders before committing to long term obligations concerning vital resources. Therefore, writer discusses 02 such lessons that can be drawn from the IWT suspension as follows.

Lesson No. 1

When a state relies on another nation for vital resources, it risks those resources being held hostage or being used as leverage or even being weaponized to the detriment of that dependent state one day. Situation is worse if the reliance is absolute without alternatives.

In contemporary international relations, many aspects, including reliance for vital resources, can be weaponized by a state against another. India’s External Affairs Minister (EAM) Jaishankar notes in this regard that:

The real problem, however, is the weaponization of everything. In recent years, the world has recognized how domains like trade, finance, investment and logistics can be leveraged for strategic purposes… it can be directing or withholding the flow of tourists, the supply of raw materials and components or exercising the power of a large vendor or customer (Jaishankar, 2024, p.165).

Interestingly, EAM Jaishankar also notes that “there is less questioning now when nations use every instrument of influence at their command to advance their interests” (Jaishankar, 2024, p.167).

Situation is worst if the reliance is absolute and there are no alternatives. Pakistan’s challenging situation is a prime example of this. Pakistan was and is naturally forced to rely on the water streams flowing from Indian territory without leaving her a choice. This lack of alternatives/absolute reliance puts Pakistan in a vulnerable position allowing India to use it as leverage if and when wanted. Therefore, unless and until this absolute reliance is remedied, Pakistan’s strategic vulnerability will persist.

Further, such weaponization can materialize at any time. For an example, IWT was suspended disturbing the water flow and data sharing only after 65 years since its adoption.

Therefore, it is important to be mindful of these threats when relying on another nation for vital resources and take precautionary and protective measures accordingly.

Lesson No. 2

The inking of an International Agreement does not guarantee the full and exact adherence by its state parties always, as states may prioritize their ‘interests’ over their ‘international law obligations’ one day if and when they are in conflict.

For an example, India was under an obligation to let the rivers flow and share data with Pakistan under the IWT. However, after the Pahalgam Attack, India opted to suspend the IWT choosing their interests over obligations. While, India did submit justifications for their actions, the reality is that, there is no court – with powers to implement its decisions - to assess the legality of those justifications and dispense justice accordingly.

Therefore, it is important to avoid loop holes in such treaties and take precautionary and protective measures to face the possibility of a state prioritizing their interests over obligations one day.

Having considered the above developments, this article now pivots to Sri Lanka’s power system and the proposed SL - India Power Grid Interconnection Project.

Snapshot of Sri Lanka’s Power System

Electricity is vital to individuals and nations alike. The prolonged power cuts during SL’s economic crisis in 2022 and recent island wide power outage that occurred on the 09^th February 2025 (where a monkey was blamed!) are capable of reminding us of the importance of electricity to individuals as well as to the nation.   

Initially, Sri Lanka’s power system was largely based on hydropower and gradually oil-based power plants and coal-based power plants were added to meet the growing electricity demand. Today, the “total installed capacity of the national power grid as at 31^st December 2024 is 6069MW” of which 64% of electricity generation is through renewable energy sources (Major Hydro, mini hydro, wind, solar, biomass, municipal solid waste) and rest of the 36% of electricity generation is through fossil fuels (coal, thermal oils etc.). It is the goal of the GOSL to “obtain 70% of electricity generation from renewable energy sources by 2030” (CEB, 2025, p.2).

SL’s transmission network, which is owned and operated by Ceylon Electricity Board consists of “998km of 220kV transmission lines and 2,405km of 132kV lines” along with “82 Grid Substations and 16 Switching stations” (CEB, 2025, p.4).

SL – India Power Grid Interconnection Project

SL and India have envisaged the interconnection of power grids of both nations for some time. In 2006, NEXANT with aid of USAID conducted a pre-feasibility study on this and subsequently, it was updated by India’s Power Grid Corporation with USAID’s support. Further, in 2010 governments of India and SL signed a MOU to conduct a detailed feasibility study (Weerasinghe, 2023). Interestingly, USAID has taken a keen interest in this regard. 

However, in a major development, a Memoranda of Understanding was exchanged between India and Sri Lanka to execute a High Voltage Direct Current Interconnection for Import/Export of Power during Indian Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Sri Lanka in April 2025 (President’s Office, 2025). As per Article I of that MOU, connection will be made between Madurai to Mannar or any other route that is more technically and economically feasible. While this is not a legally binding treaty, it clearly shows the clarity of understanding between the 02 governments.

Highlighting the importance of such connectivity, Pathfinder Foundation (2024, p.6) has noted that it will “[enable] bidirectional electricity trade and [enhance] energy security and efficiency of both countries” and “[ensure] a reliable and sustainable power supply”.

Further, SL could significantly reduce energy production costs and increase its power availability through importing electricity from India through this project. Further, the “ability to trade with India could improve grid resiliency in Sri Lanka during contingency events” such as when there is “limited water available for hydro generation” (NREL, 2018, p.38). Moreover, SL could also export electricity to India (NREL, 2018).

However, NREL (2018) notes that, while direct current ties may improve SL’s security of electricity supply, it may also “create new operational and national security risks” (p.48) such as by relying “heavily on imports to meet domestic electricity needs” (p.38).

As per Witharana (2023), advantage of a gird connection goes more to the nation that produces more and he notes that, India is the world’s 3^rd largest electricity producer who exports electricity even to Bangladesh, Myanmar and Nepal.

Further, Alagiyawanna (2025, p.1) notes that “behind this optimistic facade lies a serious threat to Sri Lanka’s sovereignty, energy security, and long-term economic independence”. Some of his salient points include;

·       Threat to local energy production through increased reliance.

·       India gaining geopolitical leverage over SL.

·   Threat to SL’s ability to maintain a Non-Aligned Foreign Policy if SL becomes dependent on India for electricity which is a vital resource.

·       Technical, Cyber and Systemic risks as “failure in one grid could cascade across the other creating widespread blackouts or technical damage” (Alagiyawanna, 2025, p.1).

Therefore, it is clear that, the proposed Power Grid Interconnection Project has both advantages and potential disadvantages to Sri Lanka.

In this background, the next section of this article will consider the application of lessons drawn from IWT suspension into the proposed SL - Indo Power Grid Interconnection Project. However, prior to that, it will briefly look at Sri Lanka – India relations over the decades to understand how it has changed over time.

Snapshot of SL – India relation

Kodikara (2018) notes that, Sri Lankan leaders after independence, have had “ambivalent attitude towards India, nursing a kind of love – hate relationship” (p.19, emphasis added).

Prior to independence, Indian National Congress and Ceylon National Congress worked closely towards achieving independence to their respective nations from the British (Jayawardene, 1992). However, India’s relations with SL were significantly damaged due to the approach taken by India during the early stages of Sri Lanka’s fight against terrorism.

For an example, Jayawardene (1992) notes that, Tamil terror outfits even received training and other facilities from bases in India.

Moreover, prior to the signing of 1987 Indo Lanka Accord:

Government of India continued to campaign throughout the world against the Government of Sri Lanka. The Indian embassies abroad became centers of support for the terrorists and separatist groups. This led to the reluctance on the part of some of the western powers to supply arms and other aid to SL. They were all anxious not to offend India (Jayawardene, 1992, p.106).

Further, when SL forces were about to end the war on terror with its Operation Liberation in 1987, India, in a manifest violation of Sri Lanka’s sovereignty, interfered in SL’s internal affairs; militarily by violating SL’s airspace; and diplomatically by putting severe pressure to SL Government through High Commissioner Dixit (Jayawardene, 1992). As a result, SL’s war on terror continued until 2009.

However, in recent times, SL - India relations have improved significantly, especially under India’s Neighborhood First Policy. According to Indian EAM Jaishankar (2024):

The heart of the Neighborhood First Policy is for India to convince its immediate neighbours of the benefits of closer ties and then proceed to make that happen on the ground (p.65).

During the Coronavirus pandemic, India gifted much needed covid vaccines under its Vaccine Maitri program together with other medical supplies to SL (High Commission of India in Colombo, 2021). During SL’s economic crisis in 2022, India aided Sri Lanka expeditiously by facilitating 4 billion US Dollars and by assisting her bid to secure IMF financial support (Rafi, 2024). Further, India has continued her support in various other ways such as by extending help to repatriate Sri Lankans from Israel due to Israel – Iran conflict (Newswire, 2025). 

Therefore, from jeopardizing SL’s national security in 1980s to expeditiously aiding SL during her worst economic crisis in 2022, SL – India relations have come a long way.

However, the reality is that, no one can predict the future of SL – India relations with full certainty as it will depend on various contexts in which this relationship will develop and personalities that will lead the two nations in future.  

Application of lessons from IWT suspension into SL – India Power Grid Interconnection Project

With the above understanding on SL – India relations, writer will now apply the 02 lessons drawn from IWT suspension into the proposed SL – India Power Grid Interconnection project.

Firstly, if SL becomes over reliant on Indian electricity imports, India will be able to use such reliance as a weapon/leverage one day at their discretion, to the detriment of SL, as electricity is a vital resource which illuminates the economy and individuals on a daily basis.

Alagiyawanna (2025, p.1) referring to a recent incident where India’s Adani group reduced the power supply to Bangladesh by half over unpaid bills causing widespread blackouts in Bangladesh notes that, “if SL becomes similarly reliant, the power to disrupt our economy will no longer rest solely with us” and such ability could be used as a bargaining chip in future.

Importantly, SL is not constrained as much as Pakistan in her water situation. Hence, a deal of this nature should be entered with utmost care, precautions and acknowledgement of the fact that it could bring negative consequences even after many years from today.

Alagiyawanna (2025, p.1) notes in this regard that, “SL must not cede control of this backbone [electricity] to any foreign entity, however friendly or cooperative they may appear today”.

Therefore, it is important to create effective alternatives to reduce the reliance on Indian electricity imports and develop our local electricity industry to ultimately achieve self-sufficiency in electricity by employing diversified renewable sources. Further, steps must be taken to avoid any sort of absolute reliance at all costs to safeguard SL’s strategic autonomy, national security and independence.

Secondly, SL must acknowledge that, despite how comforting the provisions of a prospective treaty in this regard may seem, it does not guarantee the full and exact adherence always as India may prioritize their interests over obligations one day, if and when they are in conflict.

While, India may submit justifications for their actions in such a situation, the reality is that, there is no court to swiftly and effectively dispense justice by assessing the legality of those justifications. In such a situation, SL will become helpless given the economic power and influence of India.

Therefore, it is important firstly, to ensure that any prospective Treaty between SL and India on High Voltage Direct Current Interconnection does not contain any loop holes and secondly, to take effective precautionary and protective measures to face the possibility of India prioritizing their interests over obligations one day.

Final Remarks on SL – Indo Power Grid Interconnection Project

In today’s highly interconnected world, it is unwise for Sri Lanka to stand against global, regional or bilateral cooperation based on misguided rhetoric. Instead, Sri Lanka should explore all such available and effective opportunities of economic cooperation to increase its balance sheet performance and economic development. In this regard, fostering good relations with our immediate neighbor India is of utmost value.

However, it is equally important to safeguard Sri Lanka’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, national security and strategic autonomy when entering into partnerships, especially, over vital resources. Further, writer wishes to note here the duty of present generation to ensure that their actions will not put the future generations of Sri Lanka in harm’s way.

Therefore, this writer notes that, the proposed High Voltage Direct Current Interconnection Project between Sri Lanka and India connecting the power grids of the two nations must be implemented only after identifying, assessing and remedying all associated strengths, weaknesses, threats and opportunities of this project in all departments. Such an assessment should involve the consideration of SL’s strategic autonomy, economic development, regional and bilateral cooperation and national security including economic security and energy security.

Further, this writer suggests that it is prudent to consider the 02 lessons (supra) drawn from IWT suspension when deciding on this project.

Conclusion

This article briefly discussed the India – Pakistan relations, their water dispute and subsequent adoption of Indus Water Treaty. Thereafter, it discussed the important provisions of IWT and its ultimate suspensions subsequent to Pahalgam terror Attack and the legality of such suspension. Then the article discussed two important lessons drawn from the IWT suspension. Thereafter, Sri Lanka’s electricity system, proposed SL – India Power Grid Interconnection Project were discussed, applying the lessons drawn from IWT suspension into the proposed project.

In conclusion, this writer reemphasizes the importance of detecting the maladies of proposed Power Grid Interconnection project at the earliest to cure them before it becomes incurable. In that way, Sri Lanka will be able to enjoy both the fruits of cooperation and safety of her vital interests.

Thank you.

References

Alagiyawanna, D. (2025, May 6). Why connecting Sri Lanka’s electricity grid to India would be grave strategic mistake | Daily FT. Www.ft.lk. https://www.ft.lk/columns/Why-connecting-Sri-Lanka-s-electricity-grid-to-India-would-be-grave-strategic-mistake/4-776214

Bajoria, R. (2025, May 27). The Indus Waters Treaty “in abeyance”: Legal implications of India’s unilateral water releases into Pakistan-Administered Kashmir. EJIL: Talk! https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-indus-waters-treaty-in-abeyance-legal-implications-of-indias-unilateral-water-releases-into-pakistan-administered-kashmir/?utm_source=mailpoet&utm_medium=email&utm_source_platform=mailpoet&utm_campaign=ejil-talk-newsletter-post-title_2

Bhasin, A. S. (2012). INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS 1947-2007 A DOCUMENTARY STUDY VOLUME-I.

Biksham Gujja. (2025, June 4). Indus Treaty: Can India Stop All the Water? - The Wire. The Wire. https://thewire.in/south-asia/indus-treaty-can-india-stop-all-the-water

Birch, D., Rasheed, A., & Drabu, I. (2006). Sharing water: engineering the Indus Water Treaty. Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers - Civil Engineering, 159(5), 31–38. https://doi.org/10.1680/cien.2006.159.5.31

Cambridge Dictionary. (2025, June 18). abeyance. @CambridgeWords. https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/abeyance

CEB. (2025). Report of the Committee to Investigate the Total Power System Failure Occurred on 09-02-2025 at 11.14hrs.

Curtis, J. (2025). Kashmir: Renewed IndiaPakistan tensions. https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-10264/CBP-10264.pdf

Dawn. (2025, April 26). PM Shehbaz says Pakistan open to “neutral, transparent” probe into Pahalgam attack. DAWN.COM. https://www.dawn.com/news/1906694

ET Online. (2025, April 23). PM Modi didn’t fly over Pakistan on return from Saudi Arabia following Pahalgam attack. The Economic Times; Economic Times. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/pm-modi-didnt-fly-over-pakistan-on-return-from-saudi-arabia-following-pahalgam-attack/articleshow/120546451.cms?from=mdr

High Commission of India in Colombo. (2021). Gifting of COVISHIELD vaccines from India to Sri Lanka. https://www.hcicolombo.gov.in/section/press-releases/gifting-of-covishield-vaccines-from-india-to-sri-lanka-i/

Jaishankar, S. (2024). Why Bharat Matters. Rupa Publications.

Jayewardene, J. R. (1992). Men and Memories. Vikas Publishing House Private.

Kodikara, S. U. (2008). Domestic Politics and Diplomacy.

Machiavelli, N. (1532). The Prince. (Original work published 1532)

Ministry of External Affairs. (2025). Statement by Foreign Secretary on the decision of the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS). Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/39442/Statement_by_Foreign_Secretary_on_the_decision_of_the_Cabinet_Committee_on_Security_CCS

Mourya, R., & Mittal, J. P. (2021). PARTITION OF INDIA -CAUSE AND EFFECT. Universe International Journal of Interdisciplinary Research, 1. https://uijir.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/UIJIR-808-PDF.pdf

Mukherjee, D. (2025, April 24). D. O. No. Y-18012/1/2024-Indus [Letter to S A Murtaza].

Newswire. (2025, June 24). India assists repatriation of 17 Lankans from Israel - Newswire. Newswire. https://www.newswire.lk/2025/06/24/india-assists-repatriation-of-17-lankans-from-israel/

NREL. (2018). Cross-Border Electricity Trade between India and Sri Lanka: Impact on Power System Operations. In Nrel.gov. https://docs.nrel.gov/docs/fy19osti/71983.pdf

Padmanabhan, K. (2025, April 25). India writes to Pakistan, officially notifying decision on Indus Waters Treaty, with reasons listed. ThePrint; theprint. https://theprint.in/diplomacy/india-writes-to-pakistan-officially-notifying-decision-on-indus-waters-treaty-with-reasons-listed/2603112/

Pathfinder Foundation. (2024). BRIDGING BORDERS: ENHANCING CONNECTIVITY BETWEEN INDIA AND SRI LANKA. https://pathfinderfoundation.org/images/publications/policy%20papers%20and%20reports/2024/indo%20-%20lanka%20connectivity%20-%20breif%20report.pdf

Phillips, S. (2017). Why Was British India Partitioned in 1947? Considering the Role of Muhammad Ali Jinnah A resource for Key Stage 4. https://www.history.ox.ac.uk/::ognode-637356::/files/download-resource-printable-pdf-3

President's Office. (2025, April 5). Seven Memoranda of Understanding Exchanged Between India and Sri Lanka Covering Multiple Sectors - President’s Office. President’s Office. https://www.presidentsoffice.gov.lk/seven-memoranda-of-understanding-exchanged-between-india-and-sri-lanka-covering-multiple-sectors/

Rafi, T. (2024, October 18). How important was India’s help to Sri Lanka in 2022? | Daily FT. Www.ft.lk. https://www.ft.lk/columns/How-important-was-India-s-help-to-Sri-Lanka-in-2022/4-768162

Rubatheesan, S. (2025). India and Lanka sign Defence MoU built on “interlinked security.” Print Edition - the Sunday Times, Sri Lanka. https://www.sundaytimes.lk/250406/news/india-and-lanka-sign-defence-mou-built-on-interlinked-security-594489.html

Vishwanath, A. (2025, May 9). India’s Indus Waters Treaty Suspension: What Happens Next? Thediplomat.com; The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2025/05/indias-indus-waters-treaty-suspension-what-happens-next/

Weerasinghe, L. (2023). India –Sri Lanka Cross Border Electricity Network Interconnection The History and the Way Forward. https://sarepenergy.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/6.-Sri-Lanka-Country-Update-Mr.-M.-Lakshitha-Weerasinghe-11th-Meeting-of-TF-2-SAREP-Kathmandu-Nepal.pdf

Witharana, C. (2023, December 17). Indo-Sri Lanka Grid Connectivity – Its Pros and Cons. Dailymirror.lk. https://www.dailymirror.lk/opinion/Indo-Sri-Lanka-Grid-Connectivity-Its-Pros-and-Cons/172-273389